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Germany

Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation

Summary
Germany's Financial Supervisory Authority, BaFin, was established within the Federal Ministry of Finance (MoF) on May 1, 2002, as an integrated financial supervisory authority for the securities, banking, and insurance sectors. According to a 2003 Financial System Stability Assessment by the International Monetary Fund, in which securities regulation practices in Germany were benchmarked against the International Organization of Securities Commissions Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, the standard of securities regulation in Germany was very high. Moreover, the MoF maintained a high standard in identifying and eliminating substantial shortcomings in securities markets regulation. Nonetheless, shortcomings were identified in the resources, staffing, and supervisory powers of the regulatory bodies of the German states, as well as in the reliance placed on collective investment scheme operators. The IMF also noted that Germany relied heavily on the use of external auditors for on-site supervision. As of 2006, several European Union (EU) Directives were transposed into German law, including the EU Takeover Directive, the EU Transparency Directive, and the EU Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments. Germany's Investment Act also underwent an important revision in 2007.

    General Overview

    In its 2003 Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) benchmarked German securities regulation practices against the International Organization of Securities Commisions (IOSCO) Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation. The IMF concluded that the standard of securities regulation in Germany was "very high" (p. 40). Moreover, the Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, or MoF) maintained a high standard in identifying and eliminating substantial shortcomings in securities markets regulation. However, the IMF report identified weaknesses in the resources, staffing, and supervisory powers of the regulatory bodies of the German states (Länder), as well as in the reliance placed on collective investment scheme operators. It also noted that Germany relied heavily on the use of external auditors for on-site supervision. In its 2003 assessment, the IMF recommended significantly increasing the number of audits performed by the Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, or BaFin) or Bundesbank staff. It also advised improving the disclosure of information to investors in prospectuses and collective investment schemes. Also, a small but significant "grey capital market" exists in Germany where unlicensed individuals offered financial products. The IMF report encouraged the MoF and the BaFin to effectively supervise this "grey capital market." Following the IMF's 2003 report, the Federal Ministry of Justice (Bundesministerium der Justiz, or BMJ) and the MoF jointly established a ten-point plan in 2003 to, inter alia, improve investor protection, increase the liability of boards of directors, and enhance oversight of auditing operations, as noted in the 2007 U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) Country Commercial Guide report.
    The 2001 Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz, or WpÜG) was amended in 2006 through the transposition of the European Union (EU) Takeover Directive No. 2004/25/EC into German law. Furthermore, the Implementation Law on Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Finanzmarktrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz, or FRUG), which entered into force on November 1, 2007, incorporated the EU Directive No. 2004/39/EC on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID) into German legislation. According to the BaFin's 2006 Annual Report, the law brings significant modifications to the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, or WpHG) and the Stock Exchange Act (Börsengesetz, or BörsG), as well as minor changes to the Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz, or KWG) in order to harmonize the licensing of institutions and the provision of services relating to securities. The EU Transparency Directive No. 2004/109/EC was also transposed into German law through the 2007 Transparency Directive Implementation Act (Transparenzrichtlinie- Umsetzungsgesetz, or TUG). Furthermore, the Investment Act (Investmentgesetz, or InvG), regulating among other issues mutual funds in Germany, underwent an important revision in 2007, which implies the exclusive supervision of mutual fund by the BaFin and is also intended to strengthen the competitiveness of the German financial sector by streamlining the approval of new financial products.
    The BaFin was established within the MoF on May 1, 2002, as an integrated financial supervisory authority, consolidating the supervisory agencies for securities (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel, or BAWe), banking (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen, or BAKred), and insurance (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen, or BAV). According to the IMF's 2003 report, the BaFin is responsible for the licensing and regulation of financial intermediaries, as well as the monitoring of market transactions, whereas the regulation of stock and derivatives exchanges is the responsibility of the relevant Exchange Supervisory Authority (Boersenaufsicht, or ESA) in each Länder. The State of Hesse has the most important ESA, which supervises both the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the Eurex under the 2007 Stock Exchange Act.
    In its 2003 assessment, the IMF noted that capital markets in Germany were large and generally sophisticated, and that the financial sector as a whole was dominated by banks. Furthermore, around 30 percent of trading activity in stocks took place over the counter, and the aforementioned, unregulated "grey capital market" also plays a role. According to BaFin's 2006 Annual Report, the total volume of securities issued nearly doubled in 2006, and the number of prospectuses reviewed by the BaFin significantly increased to 1,402.The Frankfurt Stock Exchange, which is operated by the Deutsche Börse, is the largest exchange organization worldwide in addition to being the most important stock exchange in Germany. The Deutsche Börse, with a market capitalization of €1.2 trillion at the end of 2005, provides electronic trading systems for buying and selling securities on stock exchanges in Europe and offers indices such as DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and XTF. Eurex, which the Deutsche Borse co-owns with the SWX Swiss Exchange, had the third highest stock option contracts traded in 2006. As of 2007, the Deutsche Börse includes 230 listed companies.
    The IOSCO multilateral memorandum of understanding (MMoU) is based on the thirty IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO Principles) adopted in 1998 and the experience gathered by securities regulators in using bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). The IOSCO MMoU provides a standardized framework for sharing enforcement-related information and a gradually expanding network of participating regulatory agencies. IOSCO members who wish to sign the IOSCO MMoU participate in a comprehensive screening process to establish that they have the legal capacity to fully comply with the terms of the IOSCO MMoU. The BaFin of Germany is a signatory to the MMoU and an ordinary member of IOSCO.


    The Principles

    1. The responsibilities of the regulator should be clear and objectively stated.

    The BaFin was established within the MoF on May 1, 2002, as an integrated financial supervisory authority, consolidating the supervisory agencies for securities (BAWe), banking (BAKred), and insurance (BAV). According to the IMF's 2003 report, the BaFin is responsible for the licensing and regulation of financial intermediaries, as well as the monitoring of market transactions, whereas the regulation of stock and derivatives exchanges is the responsibility of the relevant Exchange Supervisory Authority in each Länder. The ESAs approve and supervise local exchanges and their members, as well as trading and settlement. Furthermore, the ESAs license and regulate market intermediaries whose sole business is the brokering of collective investment schemes. The State of Hesse has the most important ESA, which supervises the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the Eurex under the 2007 BörsG. As noted in the IMF's 2003 assessment, a small "grey capital market" existed in Germany where unlicensed individuals offered financial products. The IMF report encouraged the MoF and the BaFin to effectively supervise this "grey capital market." Furthermore, the MoF was advised to "review the current distribution of responsibilities for exchange supervision between BaFin and the Länder" (p. 42). However, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    2. The regulator should be operationally independent and accountable in the exercise of its functions and powers.

    The main issue assessed in the IMF's 2003 report concerned the relationship between the BaFin, the ESAs, and the responsible Länder ministries. In its 2003 assessment, the IMF stated that BaFin's functions and organization were independent from the MoF. The IMF report raised concerns, however, regarding the independence of the ESAs from their respective Länder ministries. The IMF further questioned the relationship between the MoF and the BaFin "surrounding the appointment and dismissal of the President and some residual powers of the Ministry to intervene in setting BaFin's internal procedures" (p. 40). In its 2003 assessment, the IMF encouraged the MoF to "clarify and narrowly define its power to give instructions to the President of BaFin" (p. 42). However, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    3. The regulator should have adequate powers, proper resources and the capacity to perform its functions and exercise its powers.

    In its 2003 assessment, the IMF identified weaknesses with regards to the resources, staffing, and supervisory powers of the regulatory bodies of the Länder. Furthermore, the structure of exchange supervision and the allocation of powers at the state level could sometimes lead to gaps in supervision. The IMF also noted that Germany relied heavily on the use of external auditors for on-site supervision. Although the lack of inspections undertaken by the BaFin did not result in inadequate supervisory standards, the IMF report recommended significantly increasing the number of audits performed by the BaFin or Bundesbank staff. The IMF report further advised reviewing the staffing and powers of the ESAs to effectively supervise exchanges, members and operators. It also encouraged the MoF to give more freedom to the BaFin in setting fees. Following the IMF's 2003 report, the BMJ and the MoF jointly established a ten-point plan in 2003 to, inter alia, improve investor protection, increase the liability of boards of directors, and enhance oversight of auditing operations. Nonetheless, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    4. The regulator should adopt clear and consistent regulatory processes.

    In its 2003 assessment, the IMF noted that although the complex legal system could sometimes complicate timely and efficient regulation, it generally supported regulators in their decision-making and enforcement processes. However, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    5. The staff of the regulator should observe the highest professional standards, including appropriate standards of confidentiality.

    According to the 2003 IMF report, BaFin's staff was competent and had integrity. The IMF report encouraged the ESAs to require staff reporting of personal transactions. However, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    6. The regulatory regime should make appropriate use of Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) that exercise some direct oversight responsibility for their respective areas of competence, to the extent appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets.

    As stated in the 2003 IMF report, regulation of market intermediaries was carried out by the BaFin, and there were no self-regulatory organizations in the securities market.

    7. SROs should be subject to the oversight of the regulator and should observe standards of fairness and confidentiality when exercising powers and delegated responsibilities.

    See Principle 6.

    8. The regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation and surveillance powers.

    In its 2003 report, the IMF noted that Germany relied heavily on the use of external auditors for on-site supervision. Although the lack of inspections undertaken by the BaFin did not result in inadequate supervisory standards, the IMF report recommended significantly increasing the number of audits performed by the BaFin or Bundesbank staff. Following the IMF's 2003 report, the BMJ and the MoF jointly established a ten-point plan in 2003 to, inter alia, improve investor protection, increase the liability of boards of directors, and enhance oversight of auditing operations, as noted in the 2007 U.S. DoC report. Nonetheless, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    9. The regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers.

    As stated in the 2003 IMF report, both the BaFin and the ESAs had a comprehensive range of enforcement powers. In addition, although the complex legal system could sometimes complicate timely and efficient regulation, it generally supported regulators in their decision-making and enforcement processes. However, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    10. The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use of inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and implementation of an effective compliance program.

    In its 2003 assessment, the IMF noted that although the complex legal system could sometimes complicate timely and efficient regulation, it generally supported regulators in their decision-making and enforcement processes. The IMF report noted, however, that Germany relied heavily on the use of external auditors for on-site supervision. Although the lack of inspections undertaken by the BaFin did not result in inadequate supervisory standards, the IMF recommended significantly increasing the number of audits performed by the BaFin or Bundesbank staff. Following the IMF's 2003 report, the BMJ and the MoF jointly established a ten-point plan in 2003 to, inter alia, improve investor protection, increase the liability of boards of directors, and enhance oversight of auditing operations, as noted in the 2007 U.S. DoC report. Nonetheless, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    11. The regulator should have authority to share both public and non-public information with domestic and foreign counterparts.

    According to the IMF's 2003 report, information-sharing constraints were in line with international standards, and cooperation between authorities was regulated under the 1998 KWG, the 1998 WpHG, and the BörsG. Regulators were authorized to exchange information through informal mechanisms. Per the same report, the BaFin signed a large number of MoUs with foreign regulatory authorities, as well as with the Committee of European Securities Regulators. In November 2003, the BaFin, as stated in its 2006 Annual Report, signed the IOSCO's MMoU, which created a new framework for worldwide information exchange between securities supervisory authorities.

    The IOSCO MMoU is based on the thirty IOSCO Principles adopted in 1998 and the experience gathered by securities regulators in using bilateral MoUs. The IOSCO MMoU provides a standardized framework for sharing enforcement-related information and a gradually expanding network of participating regulatory agencies. IOSCO members who wish to sign the IOSCO MMoU participate in a comprehensive screening process to establish that they have the legal capacity to fully comply with the terms of the IOSCO MMoU. The BaFin of Germany is a signatory to the MMoU and an ordinary member of IOSCO. However, the available information does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    12. Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that set out when and how they will share both public and non-public information with their domestic and foreign counterparts.

    See Principle 11.

    13. The regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided to foreign regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of their functions and exercise of their powers.

    See Principle 11.

    14. There should be full, timely and accurate disclosure of financial results and other information that is material to investors’ decisions.

    As noted in the IMF's 2003 report, the disclosure of information to shareholders was in line with international best practices under the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act. Investors were further protected through new legal obligations on the disclosure of significant shareholdings and share transactions by management, supervisory board members, and family members. In its 2003 report, the IMF encouraged both the BaFin and the ESAs to "consider offering additional guidance on the materiality provisions in prospectus requirements" (p. 42). Following the IMF's 2003 assessment, the German authorities responded that all EU prospectus directives had been fully implemented (combined in Directive 2001/34/EC). According to BaFin's 2006 Annual Report, the BaFin is responsible for reviewing all securities prospectuses under the Securities Prospectus Act (Wertpapierprospektgesetz, orWpPG), which entered into force in 2005. In 2006, per the same report, the number of prospectuses issued to the BaFin significantly increased, amounting to 1,402. In its 2006 Annual Report, the BaFin noted that the TUG, which was enacted in 2007 transposed the EU Transparency Directive into German legislation to enable investors to "gain access to reliable, complete and up-to-date information on the issuers of securities, as well as on the key participating interests of shareholders" (p. 145). Nonetheless, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    15. Holders of securities in a company should be treated in a fair and equitable manner.

    As noted in the IMF's 2003 report, the disclosure of information to shareholders was in line with international best practices under the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act. Furthermore, new legal obligations on the disclosure of significant shareholdings, and share transactions by management, supervisory board members, as well as family members, provided additional protection. In 2002, the Government Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code (Cromme Commission) established a Corporate Governance Code for listed companies, which is voluntary but based on the comply-or-explain principle. Furthermore, according to a 2004 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Survey on Corporate Governance, the protection of minority shareholders was covered by an explicit law on groups of companies. Oppression of minority shareholders could occur, however, if the management board entered into an agreement with another company, giving it full and unrestricted control. However, neither assessment directly addresses Germany's compliance with this principle.

    16. Accounting and auditing standards should be of a high and internationally acceptable quality.

    According to the IMF's 2003 assessment, the German HGB accounting rules ("German GAAP") complied with the relevant EU Directive. There were however discrepancies between the HGB accounting rules and the international accounting standards (IAS). In its 2003 report, the IMF encouraged the MoF to strengthen the function of auditors and give more powers to the BaFin in selecting proposed auditors. Following the IMF's 2003 report, the BMJ and the MoF jointly established a ten-point plan in 2003 to, inter alia, improve investor protection, increase the liability of boards of directors, and enhance oversight of auditing operations, as noted in the 2007 U.S. DoC report. Furthermore, Germany improved its regulatory framework in 2005 by requiring all listed companies to prepare their consolidated accounts in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), formerly the IASs, as noted in the 2006 European Commission (EC) report on the implementation of the Regulation No. 1606/2002. According to BaFin's 2006 Annual Report, the securities prospectuses reviewed by the BaFin in 2006 contained for the most part consolidated financial statements that were in line with IFRS. However, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    17. The regulatory system should set standards for the eligibility and the regulation of those who wish to market or operate a collective investment scheme.

    According to the IMF's 2003 report, the standard of collective investment schemes and operators' supervision was generally high. Furthermore, market intermediaries whose sole business was the broking of collective investment schemes were licensed and regulated by the ESAs. The IMF report, however, identified weaknesses with regard to the reliance placed on collective investment scheme operators. In its 2003 assessment, the IMF recommended improving the disclosure of information to investors in collective investment schemes. The IMF further noted that German authorities intended to "review legislation on the powers of the Länder to regulate brokers of collective investment schemes in order to enhance investor protection" (p. 41). Nevertheless, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    18. The regulatory system should provide for rules governing the legal form and structure of collective investment schemes and the segregation and protection of client assets.

    See Principle 17.

    19. Regulation should require disclosure, as set forth under the principles for issuers, which is necessary to evaluate the suitability of a collective investment scheme for a particular investor and the value of the investor’s interest in the scheme.

    According to the IMF's 2003 report, the standard of collective investment schemes and operators' supervision was generally high. In its 2003 assessment, the IMF recommended improving the disclosure of information to investors in collective investment schemes. It also encouraged the BaFin to provide "additional guidance on the disclosure of material information relating to the fund, the operator, or its management" (p. 42). Nonetheless, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    20. Regulation should ensure that there is a proper and disclosed basis for asset valuation and the pricing and the redemption of units in a collective investment scheme.

    There is insufficient information publicly available addressing Germany's compliance with this Principle.

    21. Regulation should provide for minimum entry standards for market intermediaries.

    In its 2003 assessment, the IMF noted that overall the supervisory system had fully adequate powers in the area of market intermediaries. Nonetheless, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    22. There should be initial and ongoing capital and other prudential requirements for market intermediaries that reflect the risks that the intermediaries undertake.

    In its 2003 assessment, the IMF noted that overall the supervisory system had fully adequate powers in the area of market intermediaries. Furthermore, the licensing and regulation of financial intermediaries were under the responsibility of the BaFin. According to BaFin's 2006 Annual Report, the Solvency Regulation (Solvabilitätsverordnung), which was revised in 2006, contains detailed provisions for appropriate capital adequacy for banks, groups of institutions and financial holding groups. Furthermore, the regulation specifies the calculation basis for minimum capital requirements for counterparty risks, market risks, and operational risks. Nonetheless, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    23. Market intermediaries should be required to comply with standards for internal organization and operational conduct that aim to protect the interests of clients, ensure proper management of risk, and under which management of the intermediary accepts primary responsibility for these matters.

    There is insufficient information publicly available addressing Germany's compliance with this Principle.

    24. There should be procedures for dealing with the failure of a market intermediary in order to minimize damage and loss to investors and to contain systemic risk.

    There is insufficient information publicly available addressing Germany's compliance with this Principle.

    25. The establishment of trading systems including securities exchanges should be subject to regulatory authorization and oversight.

    According to the IMF's 2003 report, the ESAs "established detailed and nondiscriminatory criteria for the approval of an exchange" (p. 42). The IMF report encouraged both the ESAs and exchanges to establish formal procedures for new product approval. However, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    26. There should be ongoing regulatory supervision of exchanges and trading systems which should aim to ensure that the integrity of trading is maintained through fair and equitable rules that strike an appropriate balance between the demands of different market participants.

    In its 2003 report, the IMF recommended requiring ESAs to monitor the actual performance of their exchange's operator on a regular basis. Nonetheless, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

    27. Regulation should promote transparency of trading.

    There is insufficient information publicly available addressing Germany's compliance with this Principle.

    28. Regulation should be designed to detect and deter manipulation and other unfair trading practices.

    There is insufficient information publicly available addressing Germany's compliance with this Principle.

    29. Regulation should aim to ensure the proper management of large exposures, default risk and market disruption.

    There is insufficient information publicly available addressing Germany's compliance with this Principle.

    30. Systems for clearing and settlement of securities transactions should be subject to regulatory oversight, and designed to ensure that they are fair, effective and efficient and that they reduce systemic risk.

    According to the IMF's 2003 report, "clearing and settlement is subject to its own safe custody legislation" (p. 40). The IMF report noted that Clearstream, which is part of the Deutsche Börse Group, provided central securities depository services to the German securities market. Furthermore, clearing and settlement of derivatives transactions were handled by the Eurex Clearing. However, the IMF assessment does not directly address Germany's compliance with this principle.

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    Sources of Assessment

    Federal Agency for Financial Services Supervision, "Annual Report 2006," 2007. Available from Federal Agency for Financial Services Supervision website. Accessed on January 16, 2008. (BaFin 2007)

    International Monetary Fund, "Germany: Financial System Stability Assessment, including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topics: Banking Supervision, Securities Regulation, Insurance Regulation, Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency, Payment Systems, and Security Settlements," Country Report No.03/343, Washington, D.C.: IMF, November 2003. Available from International Monetary Fund website. Accessed on January 23, 2008. (IMF 2003)

    Relevant Organizations

    Clearstream - Deutsche Börse Group

    Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)

    Eurex Clearing

    Exchange Supervisory Authority -- Boersenaufsicht (ESA) (in German only)

    Federal Agency for Financial Services Supervision -- Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin)

    Federal Ministry of Finance -- Bundesministerium der Finanzen (MoF) (in German only)

    Federal Ministry of Justice -- Bundesministerium der Justiz (BMJ)

    Frankfurt Stock Exchange -- Deutsche Börse

    German Stock Market Institute -- Deutsches Aktieninstitut

    Government Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code (Cromme Commission)



    Relevant Legislation/Regulation

    Stock Corporation Act, 1965 (last amended July 2007) -- Aktiengesetz, 1965 (in German only)

    Securities Trading Act, 1998 (last amended January 2007) -- Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, 1998.

    Stock Exchange Act, 2007 -- Börsengesetz, 2007 (in German only)

    Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act, 2001 (last amended January 2007) -- Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz, 2001

    Securities Prospectus Act, 2005 -- Wertpapierprospektgesetz, 2005

    Banking Act, 1998 (last amended July 2007) -- Kreditwesengesetz, 1998

    Transparency Directive Implementation Act, 2007 -- Transparenzrichtlinie- Umsetzungsgesetz, 2007 (in German only)

    Implementation Law on Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, 2007 -- Finanzmarktrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz, 2007

    Law on the Prospectus for Securities Offered for Sale, 1998 -- Wertpapier-Verkaufsprospektgesetz, 1998

    Law on Federal Institution for Supervision on Financial Services, 2002 (last amended May 2007) -- Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz, 2002 (in German only)

    Act on the Improvement of Investor Protection, 2004 -- Anlegerschutzverbesserungsgesetz, 2004 (in German only)

    Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act, 2002 -- Viertes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetzes (in German only)

    Investment Act, 2003 (last amended December 2007) -- Investmentgesetz, 2003, (in German only), December 2003

    Regulation governing the capital adequacy of institutions, groups of institutions and financial holding groups (Solvency Regulation), 2006 -- Solvabilitätsverordnung, 2006 (in German only)

    Market Manipulation Definition Regulation, 2005

    Corporate Governance Code, 2002 (last amended June 2007)

    EU Directive No. 2004/39/EC on Markets in Financial Instruments, 2004

    EU Directive No. 2001/34/EC on the Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listings and on Information to be Published on those Securities, 2001

    EU Transparency Directive No. 2004/109/EC, 2004

    EU Takeover Directive No. 2004/25/EC, 2004

    European Commission Regulation No 1606/2002 On the Application of International Accounting Standards, 2002



    Supplementary Sources

    Institute of International Bankers, "2007 Global Survey: Regulatory and Market Developments - Banking, Securities and Insurance," October 2007. Available from Institute of International Bankers website. Accessed on January 23, 2008. (IIB 2007)

    International Organization of Securities Commissions website. Accessed on January 23, 2008. (IOSCO website) www.iosco.org

    Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, "Corporate Governance - A Survey of OECD Countries," 2004. Available from Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development website. Accessed on January 23, 2008. (OECD 2004)

    U.S. Department of Commerce, "Doing Business in Germany: A Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies," U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, May 2007. Available from U.S. Department of Commerce website. Accessed on January 23, 2008. (U.S. DoC 2007)
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