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Browse Profiles > Netherlands > Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation |
| Score | Rank | |
| Standards Compliance Index | 65.00 out of 100 | 9 |
| Business Indicator Index | 10.98 out of 12 | 3 |
Netherlands|
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation
According to the 2004 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Financial System Stability Assessment, the Dutch financial regulatory system is mostly in compliance with International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Principles and Objectives of Securities Regulation. The IMF attributed the effective regulation to a strong regulatory body with the necessary powers to carry out its responsibilities and increasingly risk-based regulatory approach. At the time of the assessment, the new law on financial supervision was expected to largely complete the ongoing regulatory transformation and address the few departures from IOSCO's Principles and Objectives. Indeed the Financial Supervision Act of 2006 entered into effect in January 2007 and applies a functional, as opposed to sectoral approach to financial markets supervision. There is no assessment as to whether the new law has effectively addressed all outstanding issues however. Nonetheless, the 2007 IMF Article IV Consultation with the Netherlands reports that, since the full implementation of the new financial supervisory framework, there has been improvement to financial firms' supervision and risk management practices. The supervisory framework and quality of supervision mostly represents international best practices. General Overview According to the 2004 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA), the Netherlands financial regulatory "demonstrates a high degree of compliance" (p. 42) with the International Organization of Securities Commissions' (IOSCO's) Principles and Objectives of Securities Regulation. Effective regulation can be attributed to a strong regulatory body with the necessary powers to carry out its responsibilities and increasingly risk-based regulatory approach. The FSSA noted that a new law on financial supervision being drafted at the time of the assessment would largely complete the ongoing regulatory transformation and address the few departures from IOSCO's Principles and Objectives of the supervisory regime at the time of the assessment.The Principles
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 79). The assessment team accepts the Netherlands's two pillar approach to financial regulation, meaning the separation of responsibilities between the DNB and the AFM. While the regulators' responsibilities and powers are clearly defined and transparent, there is some concern over the overlap of activities. The FSAP notes that steps must be taken to increase the confidence of market participants in the division of responsibilities. Also, the upcoming transfer of the responsibility to monitor prospectuses from AEX to the AMF should be finalized and a plan developed so that the transition goes smoothly. The FSAP recommends that the authorities consider publicly stipulation when the MoF can use its power to grant exemptions from regulatory requirements. In addition, the FSAP is concerned that in waiving regulatory requirements, the AFM and DNB will lead to regulations being applied inconsistently and inhibit transparency. It suggests that the level of detail in legislation be reviewed to consider whether it is necessary. Finally, the assessment team recommends that explicit requirements be included in the new financial supervision law that requires the MoF to consult with the regulatory bodies before exercising financial service regulatory powers.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "broadly implemented" (p. 83).The regulators act independently in carrying out their day to day responsibilities and there is nothing that implies their regulatory decisions are externally influenced, but legislation does not provide sufficient protection to maintain that independence. The FSAP recommends several adjustments to reinforce the regulators' independence. The balance between topics included in Acts, Decrees, and Regulations should be reviewed. The budget should be approved for longer periods of time. The regulators should build up reserves for budgetary protection. The consultation process between the regulators and MoF should be more transparent. There should be legal immunity for actions taken by the regulators in good faith. Directions from the MoF to the regulators should be made public. Investors' representative should be offered the opportunity to comment on the regulatory authority budget. However, when the authorities were given the opportunity to respond, they commented that the current arrangements would make it highly unlikely that anything would impede upon the independence of the regulators, noting that several of assessment team's recommendations have already been accounted for.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 85). The regulators licensing, supervision and enforcement powers are sufficient. The AFM regularly utilizes its enforcement powers. However, decreasing the detailed regulations of the AFM and DNB, as recommended in Principle 1, could inhibit the regulators supervisory powers by preventing them from quickly adapting to the changing markets. The assessment explains that under the new financial markets supervision law, each institution will have a lead regulator that has principal licensing power. This may lead to the second regulators losing authority over the institutions. Thus, it is recommended that the AFM be able to seek restitution via court or directly order restitution, subject to the proper hearings and appeals procedures. In addition, the budget should be approved for longer periods of time and the regulators should build up reserves for budgetary protection.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 86). The FSAP reports that the AFM has a clear and consistent regulatory process, which applies to the regulators own activities and are fully known by the target of enforcement. There is a consultation process when developing policies, all policies are published, and public statements are made about the effects of the policies. However, the consultation process between the regulators and MoF should be more transparent and the high level of detail in regulations raises some concerns. The policy of waiving rules for special exceptions could lead to an inconsistent regulatory process. The FSAP recommends that smaller market participants be consulted about their problems with complying with the regulations and it be discussed how to address the concerns.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 87). The staff must adhere to strict professional standards and follow conflicts of interests and confidentiality requirements. However, the FSAP warns that the AFM is growing quickly, and the training and assimilating of staff at such a rapid rate requires a continued commitment to training and development.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p.88). The FSAP indicates that AEX is the only SRO in the Netherlands. The MoF has the power to recognize SROs but has delegated the oversight powers to the AFM. In practice, the AFM plays an advisory role for the MoF in any new recognition decisions. However, the assessment team recommends that the criteria for recognition decisions be published. Also, suggests that the same regulator who has oversight power should have the power to recognize SROs. According to the AFM website, listing applications are still handled by AEX, but in 2005, the responsibility to assess and approve prospectuses for listed securities was transferred to the AFM as a result of the Prospectus Directive.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 90). The FSAP indicates that AEX is the only SRO in the Netherlands. The MoF has the power to recognize SROs but has delegated the oversight powers to the AFM. In practice, the AFM plays an advisory role for the MoF in any new recognition decisions. However, the assessment team recommends that the criteria for recognition decisions be published and suggests that the same regulator who has oversight power should have the power to recognize SROs. In addition, while there is no discrepancy between the AEX and AFM's perspective of the AFM's power to approve AEX rules, the approval and commenting process should be explicitly stated. In addition, while there are no explicit requirements for fair and equal treatment of all market participants, both the AFM and DNB recognize that the proper operation of the securities markets depends on it. According to the AFM website, AEX is responsible for supervising the market. The AFM website indicates that listing applications are still handled by AEX, but in 2005, the responsibility to assess and approve prospectuses for listed securities was transferred to the AFM as a result of the Prospectus Directive.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 92). While the enforcement powers of the DNB and AFM are generally adequate and are not typically inhibited in practice, the enforcement powers of the regulators should be expanded and clarified by the law. Current law limits the institutions from which the regulators can obtain information and should be changed so that the regulators can obtain information from anyone reasonable believed to have the necessary information. Also, there is no stipulation that ensures the accuracy of information turned over to the regulators. The law should be amended to prohibit false information being supplied to the AFM and DNB. The AFM website indicates that the Financial Supervision Act of 2006 entered into effect in January 2007, which applies a functional, as opposed to sectoral approach to financial markets supervision. It improves the financial sector supervision framework, as well as defines the requirements that apply to financial services providers. Part 1 of the Act identifies the responsibilities of the supervisors, their tools for carrying out their responsibilities, and guidelines for cooperation between the supervisors.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 94). While the enforcement powers of the DNB and AFM are generally adequate and are not typically inhibited in practice, the FSAP recommends that the enforcement powers of the regulators be expanded and clarified in the law. The law limits the institutions from which the regulators can obtain information. The law should be changed so that the regulators can obtain information from anyone who is reasonably believed to have the necessary information. While the regulator may require a person to make a statement, it is suggested that legislation explicitly state the regulators' right to do so as part of their information gathering powers. Also, public statements by the regulators can be a useful sanction and tool to raise public awareness. The FSAP suggests that the sanctioning power of the regulators be expanded to include public statement. While the powers of the regulator meet international best practices, some market participants are unhappy with their range of regulatory powers. The assessment team recommends spreading public awareness about international standards and how the regulators meet them. Also, because of the changing responsibilities of the regulators, the FSAP recognizes that enforcement gaps will inevitably emerge. The powers of the two regulators should be reviewed to identify and deal with any gaps.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 96). While the powers of the regulator meet international best practices, some market participants are unhappy with their range of regulatory powers, To resolve this, the FSAP recommends spreading public awareness about international standards, and how the regulators meet them. It also suggests that the significance of any weaknesses in compliance be assessed by the regulated entity.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 98). The 2004 IMF FSAP judged that the AFM and DNB's cooperation powers meet the Principle's criteria. The AFM website indicates that the Financial Supervision Act of 2006 entered into effect in January 2007, which applies a functional, as opposed to sectoral approach to financial markets supervision. Part 1 of the Act identifies the responsibilities of the supervisors, their tools for carrying out their responsibilities and guidelines for cooperation between the supervisors.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 99). It reports that the AFM and DNB have the power to enter into information sharing agreements with each other and foreign regulators, and have done so.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "partly implemented" (p. 90). The IOSCO MMoU is based on the thirty IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation adopted in 1998 and the experience gathered by securities regulators in using bilateral MoUs. The IOSCO MMoU provides a standardized framework for sharing enforcement-related information and a gradually expanding network of participating regulatory agencies. IOSCO members who wish to sign the IOSCO MMoU participate in a comprehensive screening process to establish that they have the legal capacity to fully comply with the terms of the IOSCO MMoU. The Ontario Securities Commission website explains that IOSCO members who complete the screening process but are found to lack the legal authority to fully comply with the terms of the IOSCO MMoU will be invited to become signatories to Annex B of the IOSCO MMoU, provided that they express their commitment to obtaining the necessary legal authority to become full signatories The IOSCO website lists the AFM as a signatory to Annex B.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 103). The FSAP reports that the IOSCO Principle, "full, accurate, and timely disclosure of financial results and other information that is material to investors' decisions," is "fully implemented" (p. 103). All public offers require a prospectus. Companies must disclose their audited annual report, semi-annual report, and all other information that could affect the price of securities. Shareholders' voting rights should be included in the articles of association. All information necessary to properly judge an offer must be released. Also, the AEX listing requirements include ongoing disclosure requirements. However, the assessment team points out that the current law allows for the interpretation that an offer may be made to a large number of people without a prospectus, and that the law should be reviewed with the intention of writing limitations into the law.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 105). Shareholders rights are covered in Dutch Company Law. Depending on the structure of a company, the shareholders' have the right to elect directors varies, but in all cases there is a balance in the shareholders rights and the need for independent directors. Major changes in corporate structure require shareholder approval, but the articles of incorporation may assign some of that power to the supervisory board. By law, shareholders in the Netherlands have significant power, but companies may limit their powers through the articles of incorporation. In 30 percent of listed companies, not all shares of the same class have the same voting power. The shares are put into a trust office and while the economic benefits are equally distributed, the voting power is granted to the trust office. The trustees of the trust office, who are often closely associated with management, exercise the voting power; and the only check that the shareholders have is requesting a court inquiry into potential mismanagement. However, the FSAP indicates that the there was proposed legislation to provide proxies to holders of depository receipts. The Company Law also covers the registration and transfer of shares and dividends and permits bearer shares. There are also protections for shareholders in the case of a takeover or change of control; and there are sanctions for a lack of compliance with notification requirements. In addition, there are disclosure requirements protecting shareholders included in the AEX regulations. The Dutch Civil Code was amended in 2004 to provide proxies to holders of depository receipts for voting, according to the Hopt et al. report.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "broadly implemented" (p. 105).Acccounting and Auditing assessment
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 109). The FSAP reports that there are entry requirements, supervision, and ongoing monitoring for collective investment schemes (CISs). To further improve CIS regulation, the FSAP recommends that the regulatory requirements be expanded to all those who carry out functions associated with CISs. Also, the assessment recognizes that so far, the general regulatory principles have been sufficient to prevent conflicts of interest, but suggests that specific rules on conflicts of interest and record-keeping be included in legislation.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 111). While the lack of a requirement that a CIS entrusts its assets to a third party as an additional safeguard to ensure the actions of a CIS are in line with the terms and conditions of the CIS. The 2004 IMF FSAP recognizes that implementing the requirement would be difficult because of the high concentration of the Dutch markets, but still suggests it be considered. Otherwise, it recommends other safeguards that ensure the proper disposal of assets.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 113). The FSAP reports that there are disclosure requirements for prospectuses, annual and semi-annual accounts, monthly statements, and key features documents, and advertising documents. The AFM must be satisfied with the information disclosed. If the Decree and annexes do no meet information requirements, the AFM may withhold authorization of a prospectus. Information in a prospectus must be updated with any changes. There are additional disclosure requirements in the Civil Code and Decree Accounting standards.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 114). While the general principles in Dutch law have been sufficient for compliance with this Principle, the rules lack specificity and do not guarantee ongoing compliance. CIS assets valuation is covered in the Dutch Civil Code and external reporting rules are set by the council on external reporting, but are not specific to CISs. The frequency of valuations must be included in the prospectus. There are no requirements for fair and reliable valuations. Consequently, the 2004 IMF FSAP recommends reviewing the specificity of the laws.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "broadly implemented" (p. 116). The names of the senior management of a regulated entity need not be made public, and the FSAP recommends that requirements be put in place to make the names available to the public. Because the Netherlands only offers one license for financial services, which allows an institution to provide any financial service, the FSAP recommends instead that licenses be required for each type of financial activity and be approved by the regulator responsible for supervising that area. The same regulator should have the authority to withdraw licenses if deemed necessary. Other suggestions include improving notification requirements by adding a broad notification requirement to notify the relevant regulator of any information that could be relevant in licensing decisions and removing the exemption for credit institutions from notifying about breaches in conduct of business regulations. The regulations governing those who are subject to checks should be broadened to include any person who could influence a license applicant.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 118). According to the FSAP, capital standards for securities comply with the EU Directive. The AFM website indicates that the Financial Supervision Act of 2006 entered into effect in January 2007. The requirements that financial services providers must meet have been simplified to reduce the administrative burden. The Act defines a financial undertaking as a management company, a CIS, an investment firm, a depositary, a clearing institution, a financial service provider, a financial institution, a credit institution, or an insurer. Part 3 of the Act covers prudential requirements for financial undertakings. Conduct of business requirements for financial undertakings are in Part 4 and market conduct rules for all market participants are in Part 5. The DNB website reports that the Act replaces seven supervision acts.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 120). While the requirement for high standards of integrity exists within several requirements, the FSAP suggests that the requirement that market intermediaries must meet the legal and regulatory obligations and maintain a high level of integrity should be explicitly stated. The AFM website indicates that the Financial Supervision Act of 2006 entered into effect in January 2007. The requirements that financial services providers must meet have been simplified to reduce the administrative burden. The Act defines a financial undertaking as a management company, a CIS, an investment firm, a depositary, a clearing institution, a financial service provider, a financial institution, a credit institution, or an insurer. Start-up requirements for financial undertakings are included in Part 2 of the Act. Part 3 covers prudential requirements for financial undertakings. Conduct of business requirements for financial undertakings are in Part 4 and market conduct rules for all market participants are in Part 5. The DNB website reports that the Act replaces seven supervision acts.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "not implemented" (p. 121). The FSAP indicates that there are no clear plans for dealing with a firm's failure. The AFM has established a procedure, but the DNB, which is most relevant to market intermediaries, has not. The AFM and DNB should establish a joint plan for addressing a firm's failure, including procedures for market disclosure. The 2007 IMF Article IV Consultation with the Netherlands reports that since the full implementation of the new financial supervisory framework, there has already been improvement to financial firms' supervision and risk management practices. The supervisory framework and quality of supervision mostly represents international best practices. Macro-prudential financial stability analysis with risk management has been advantageous to both supervisors and financial institutions. DNB has started using a systemic risk-based supervision framework that tailors its supervision to individual institutions. DNB and AFM coordinate their supervision under a covenant agreement which has solved initial coordination issues. The new information is not reflected in the IMF's 2004 assessment.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 124). The FSAP recommends that the AFM establish and publish clear recognition criteria to increase the transparency of its supervision of AEX and subsequently issue instructions based on these criteria.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 125). Since it is a key regulatory tool, the contribution model should be finalized as quickly as possible and be applicable to AEX, as a pan-European exchange. Also, all harmonized matters should be covered in the MoU among the five regulators.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 126). Pre- and post-trade reporting requirements are in line with international standards, including the EU Investment Services Directive. To further improve transparency, the FSAP recommends that the AFM and Euronext review the rule covering block trades.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 127). The law prohibits market manipulation and insider trading. The FSAP explains that securities institutions are prohibited from taking misleading action or misrepresenting financial transactions. Euronext reports all transactions to the AMF and the AMF independently monitors market function. AMF carries out investigations and can impose fines, or may report an offense to the public prosecutor.
According to the 2004 IMF FSAP, this principle is "fully implemented" (p. 128). The DNB is responsible for the supervision of Investment Firms and Banks' financial positions. Clearnet is a clearing house and responsible for monitoring large exposures of its Clearing Members. Clearnet can require information from Clearing Member, including clients' daily open positions. Clearnet can impose sanctions for refusal to provide information on large positions. Euronext can suspend Clearing Members from Trading. Also, there is a separation of client funds from the Investment Firm to protect investors. Compliance with Clearnet rules is required in the Euronext rulebook.
The 2004 IMF FSAP reports that AEX, which was previously known as the Amsterdam Exchange, is a subsidiary of Euronext Group and is the primary securities market in the Netherlands. The FSAP reports that, like the other Euronext Group members, Euroclear group conducts its clearing and settlement. AEX has two tiers of rules, one which applies to all Euronext Group members, and one which applies only to AEX members. The Securities Trade Act provides the legal bases for the oversight and supervision of securities clearing and settlement systems, "according to which the Minister of Finance shall verify the settlement system when recognizing (licensing) a securities exchange" (p. 165). This establishes indirect supervision of Clearnet and Euroclear activities. |
Jump to other standards Sources of Assessment International Monetary Fund, "Financial Sector Assessment Program The Kingdom Of The Netherlands - Detailed Assessments of Standards and Codes," Country Report No. 04/310, Washington, D.C.: IMF, September 2004. Available from International Monetary Fund website. Accessed on December 10, 2007. (IMF 2004a) International Monetary Fund, "The Kingdom of the Netherlands: Financial System Stability Assessment, including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topics: Banking Supervision, Securities Regulation, Insurance Regulation, Corporate Governance, and Payment Systems, Securities Settlement Systems, and Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism," Country Report No. 04/312, Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2004. Available from International Monetary Fund website. Accessed on December 10, 2007. (IMF 2004b) Relevant Organizations Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) Dutch Central Bank - De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) Euronext Amsterdam Financial Markets Authority - Autoriteit Financiele Markten (AFM) Ministry of Economic Affairs Ministry of Finance (MoF) Relevant Legislation/Regulation Financial Supervision Act, 2006 Listing and Issuing Rules of Euronext Amsterdam Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, 2004 EU Market Abuse Directive, 2003 Act on the Disclosure of Major Holdings and Capital Interests in Securities-Issuing Institutions, 2006 - Wet melding zeggenschap en kapitaalbelang in effectenuitgevende instellingen, 2006 Decree on the Disclosure of Major Holding and Capital Interests in Issuing Securities - Besluit melding zeggenschap en kapitaalbelang in uitgevende instellingen Financial Services Act, effective January 2006 Further Regulations on Market Conduct Supervision of the Securities Trade, 2002 Investment Undertakings Act, 1990 Decree on the Supervision of the Securities Trade, 1995 Act on the Supervision of the Securities Trade, 1995 Decree on Collective Investment Schemes Supplementary Sources Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, "Second Report on Compliance with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code," December 2006. Available from Corporate Governance Committee website. Accessed on December 10, 2007. (CGCMC 2006) De Nederlandsche Bank website. Accessed on December 10, 2007. (DNB website) Hopt, K. et al., "European Corporate Governance in Company Law and Codes," report prepared for the European Corporate Governance Conference of October 18, 2004, The Netherlands. Available from Monitoring Commission of the Corporate Governance Code website. Accessed on December 6, 2007 (Hopt et al., 2004) International Monetary Fund, "Kingdom of the Netherlands--Netherlands: 2007 Article IV Consultation--Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Kingdom of the Netherlands--Netherlands," Country Report No. 07/216, Washington, D.C.: IMF, June 2007. Available from International Monetary Fund website. Accessed on December 10, 2007. (IMF 2007) International Organization of Securities Commissions website. Accessed on December 10, 2007. (IOSCO website) www.iosco.org Financial Markets Authority website. Accessed on December 10, 2007. (AFM website) Kleyn, J. et al., "Dutch Trends," 2007. Available from International Financial Law Review website. Accessed on December 10, 2007. (Kleyn, J et al. 2007) Ministry of Finance website. Accessed on December 10, 2007. (MoF website) Ontario Securities Commission, "International Memoranda of Understanding," Available from Ontario Securities Commission website. Accessed on December 10, 2007. (OSC website) |